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These assessments were generally undertaken in a large group format, but were on occasion
more effective when presented and discussed in smaller interest group sessions. The smaller
sessions provided an opportunity for the groups to more frankly evaluate their options,
contributions and the costs and benefits of going forward separately or together. Shuttle
discussions coupled with the modeling provided the opportunity for each group to evaluate just
what would ultimately constitute a good mediated settlement.
The primary features of this internal-to-the-group or self-mediated process were:
1. An easy to understand baseline of source documents.
2. Standardized data classified into objective, understandable groupings which related to
the ROD.
3. Simplified decisions that minimized transactions costs.
4. Process steps to assure that each company had a full understanding of its documents.
With this baseline and an ability to see the effects of discount changes, frank negotiation
yielded an agreement, i.e. an outcome with which all parties were equally unhappy, but which
they nearly all considered acceptable. The group, with one defection, moved forward to resolve
its liability with the EPA and implement a cleanup in less time and with lower transaction costs
than would have been expected. That is real progress in Superfund terms.

What is a Pond? Michigan Court of Appeals Interprets “Waters of the State”
Under Michigan Law
Nick Schroeck and Justin Sterk 1

A waterbody in Michigan that fails to meet the designation of “waters of the United States”
under the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251 et seq., may still meet the state’s designation of
“waters of the state” under Michigan’s Natural Resources and Environmental Protection Act,
MCL § 324.20101 et seq. As illustrated by a the recent unpublished opinion from the Michigan
Court of Appeals case, Charter Twp. of Plainfield v. Department of Natural Resources &
Environment, 2 point sources that are not subject to the federal National Pollutant Discharge
Elimination System (NPDES) permit program could still be required to obtain a state permit.
Plainfield involved the Charter Township of Plainfield’s (Township) sewer waste water
treatment plant and its byproducts, including sewage sludge and backwash water. The receiving
location of the Township’s treated waste water is the Coit Avenue Gravel Pit (CAP), which also
stores the byproducts from the treatment plant’s operation. The CAP is an open area between
thirty-five and thirty-eight acres and is closed off from other bodies of water. There is no
natural surface outlet to the nearby Grand River or to any other stream.
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In Michigan “a person shall not discharge any waste or waste effluent into the waters of this
state unless the person is in possession of a valid permit from the department.” 3 The Township
originally applied to the DNRE 4 for a permit to use the CAP to hold backwash water and water
softening sludge in 1987, but was told that a NPDES permit was not required due to the DNRE’s
conclusion that the CAP was not a “water of the state” which, in Michigan, includes both
groundwater and surface water.5 The DNRE reasoned that the CAP met the exemption in the
Michigan Administrative Code that “surface waters of the state” explicitly did not include
“drainage ways and ponds used solely for wastewater conveyance, treatment, or control.” 6 This
decision from the DNRE gave Plainfield Township license to use the CAP as part of its
wastewater treatment program without any permitting requirements.
However, in 2009, the DNRE informed the Township that it now considered the CAP to be
“surface waters of the state” because it was hydrogeologically connected by groundwater to
the Grand River. The Township filed its initial complaint in Kent County Circuit Court, asserting
that: (1) the Township was entitled to a declaratory judgment that the waters of the CAP are
not “waters of the state”; (2) equitable estoppel barred the DNRE from ruling that the CAP is
“waters of the state”; (3) collateral estoppel barred the DNRE from ruling that the CAP is
“waters of the state”; and (4) the DNRE’s attempt to rule that the CAP is “waters of the state”
constituted inverse condemnation. After the DNRE moved to dismiss counts two through four,
the Township filed an amended complaint seeking only declaratory judgment that the waters of
the CAP are not “waters of the state.” The DNRE argued that the CAP was not a “pond” and was
not used “solely” for wastewater conveyance, treatment, or control because it was
hydrogeologically connected by groundwater to the adjacent Grand River. The Township
contended that the CAP was not “waters of the state” subject to NPDES permitting because it
was a “pond” that was “solely” used for wastewater conveyance, meeting the exemption. The
Township also argued that the DNRE should be prevented from defending the case on estoppel
grounds, given the years in which the DNRE had advised the Township that the CAP was exempt
from permitting.
On January 17, 2013, the trial court granted summary disposition to the DNRE, ruling that the
CAP constituted “waters of the state” because the waters in the CAP are drawn from and
interchange with the groundwater system which includes the Grand River. The court held that
the CAP was not a “drainage way or pond used solely for wastewater conveyance, treatment, or
control.”
The Township appealed. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded to the trial court to (1)
determine whether the DNRE is barred from asserting that the CAP is not a pond, (2) if
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necessary, determine whether the CAP is a pond, and (3) conduct any other proceedings not
inconsistent with its opinion.
The central question for the Court of Appeals was whether, for purposes of Michigan
Administrative Code Rule 323.1041, the CAP constituted “waters of the state” or instead was
merely a “pond.” The pertinent section of the statute provides as follows:
“A person shall not directly or indirectly discharge into waters of the state a
substance that is or may become injurious to (a) the public health, safety or
welfare, (b) domestic, commercial, industrial, agricultural, recreational, or other
uses that are being made or may be made of such waters, (c) the value or utility
of riparian lands, (d) livestock, wild animals, birds, fish, aquatic life, or plants or
their growth or propagation, or (e) the value of fish and game.” 7
Further, “a person shall not discharge any waste or waste effluent into waters of this state
unless the person is in possession of a valid permit from the department,” 8 and “waters of the
state means groundwaters, lakes, rivers, and streams and all other watercourses and waters,
including the Great Lakes, within the jurisdiction of this state.” 9 The legislature delegated
authority to DNRE to “protect and conserve water resources of the state” and to “have control
of the pollution of surface or underground waters of the state and the Great Lakes, which are or
may be affected by waste disposal of any person.” 10 The legislature also delegated to DNRE the
authority to “promulgate rules to carry out its duty to protect Michigan’s water resources.” 11 In
carrying out this authority, the DNRE defined surface waters of the state to mean (1) the Great
Lakes and their connecting waters, (2) all inland lakes, (3) rivers, (4) streams, (5) impoundments,
(6) open drains, (7) wetlands, and (8) other surface bodies of water within the confines of the
state, but explicitly exempting “drainage ways and ponds used solely for wastewater
conveyance, treatment, or control.” 12
The Township argued that the CAP is used solely for wastewater conveyances, treatment, or
control and is exempt from Part 4 of the Michigan Administrative Rules governing water
resource protection and the DNRE’s permitting authority. The Township’s specific argument
concerned the word “used” and that it was meant in the context of human use. The DNRE
maintained that the CAP is not used solely for wastewater conveyances, treatment, or control
because the CAP’s naturally occurring interchange of water with the groundwater system was
also sufficient to constitute a use.
The trial court agreed with the DNRE’s interpretation, but the Court of Appeals reversed, calling
the lower court’s view of the regulation overbroad. The Court of Appeals reasoned that if the
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mere movement of groundwater through a pond constituted a use, then there was no pond
that could qualify for the exemption unless it was artificially lined, which is not required within
the text of the exemption. The Court further explained that statutes must be read in the
context of their placement and their purpose in the scheme of administrative rules and that the
purpose of this provision was to allow an exemption under certain defined circumstances. The
Court of Appeals concluded that the only use of the CAP is wastewater conveyance, treatment,
or control and that the use was consistent with exempting the CAP from designation as
“surface waters of the state” under Rule 323.1044(u).
The issue of whether or not the CAP could be considered a “pond” under Rule 323.1044(u) is
left to be decided by the trial court on remand. The Court of Appeals noted that the regulation
failed to properly define “pond” and that the dictionary provides little assistance. Webster’s
dictionary defines pond as a body of water smaller than a lake, sometimes artificially formed,
and defined lake as a body of fresh or salt water of considerable size, surrounded by land. The
Court found that the vagueness of the definition did not lead to a conclusion that the CAP was
or was not a pond as a matter of law.
Beyond the application of a number of Michigan’s water protection statutes, this case serves as
a reminder that potential dischargers must comply not only with federal water quality
standards and permit programs, but regulation at the state level as well. The federal Clean
Water Act generally prohibits discharges of pollutants from point sources into waters of the
United States13 and the United States Supreme Court has held that a waterbody is a “water of
the United States” if it has a significant nexus to navigable waters of the United States.14 The
Clean Water Act also gave authority to the states to expand on the standards set by Congress. 15
However, in Michigan, a second designation of “waters” must be met: waters of the state.
Michigan’s NPDES permits use a slightly more expansive definition of “waters” to determine
applicability. As illustrated by Plainfield, even if a discharge is not into “waters of the United
States,” the discharge is not necessarily exempt from NPDES permitting requirements at the
state level.

13

33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1).
Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715 (2006)
15
33 U.S.C. § 1370.
14

